than defensive. some said to kennedy and around the table that, you know, these could be a threat to the hemisphere, cuban subversion, which was greatly feared. in fact, the big fear was that not so much that cuba was a threat, but it was spreading to other countries, and brazil, was feared, would be a second cuba. kennedy and the advisers, tell me, the tapes you studied carefully in the aftermath, and i should mention, of course, david is going to be publishing, been editing volumes of the transfers -- come back to these later -- never accepted khrushchev's public rationale to deploy them, which was to detour an american invasion, detour another bay of pigs, but with the american forces, not cubans. they always put the worst case analysis and why all of these materials were there. is that fair to say that that view never shifted even though some of them were aware of the overt american operations against castro and intended to overthrow castro? >> guest: i'll get the first part of the question there too because i think it's interesting. there's an aspect that came through in rece
